Infighting Likely to Grip CCP as Xi Jinping’s Health Fails, Experts Say

Amid speculation about Xi Jinping’s health, experts say that if the Chinese leader were to become incapacitated or worse, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would likely plunge into a power struggle that could paralyze the regime or even lead to its collapse.

Rumors about health problems have plagued Xi since 2019 and have come to the forefront during his recent trips to the United States and India, where it appeared he had some difficulty walking.

The Wall Street Journal, citing unnamed sources, added further details about Xi’s aides planning his schedule around how far he could walk and how long he could stand, although the information remains unconfirmed.

One’s health is a decidedly personal matter, but in the case of the leader of a highly secretive regime, it could have far-reaching geopolitical implications, several experts told The Epoch Times.

“If he were to die or become incapacitated, then the regime would have conceivably no clear authority,” said Bradley Thayer, a fellow at the American Freedom Alliance and the author of “America’s 100 Years’ War: How to Win Against Communism.”

“That can be a particularly dangerous time in communist regimes, as perhaps there would be competing factions vying for control.”

Given that Xi’s condition is treated as a state secret, speculation is inevitable and to some degree justified, at least as far as it’s necessary to prepare for the most likely eventualities, the experts said.

Most agreed that Xi’s recent appearances indicate health problems.

“Xi Jinping has increasingly struggled to maintain control over his own image or even his own pace during public appearances—even when those appearances are brief or take place on the international stage,” said Wang Juntao, a U.S.-based political scholar and chair of the National Committee of the Chinese Democracy Party.

“This leads me to believe that Xi Jinping is facing significant health problems.”

There have been rumors that Xi has suffered a stroke, but his appearances seem to rule out major brain damage.

“He does look like he might have suffered a minor stroke a couple of years ago,” said Dong Xiong, a veteran China commentator who runs the YouTube channel Digging Into China.

He noted Xi’s uncomfortable walk and that he was holding on to the hand of his wife, Peng Liyuan.

“In the past, when Chinese leaders visit other countries, their spouses usually do not accompany them. Even if they do, they usually don’t hold hands in public,” Dong told The Epoch Times.

“Of course, [the] Chinese state propaganda machine will portray that as a show of love, a show of affection. But actually, Chinese people know it’s not. Peng Liyuan is acting as his walking stick.”

A source familiar with CCP internal affairs told The Epoch Times that Xi suffers from a neurological condition that affects his ability to move his body freely.

“It might mean, for example, that he can’t turn his neck or that he can only walk in one specific posture—any other movement would cause him severe pain,” the source said. The Epoch Times couldn’t confirm his account.

According to The Wall Street Journal, accommodating Xi’s physical limitations was part of advanced preparations for his U.S. visit. That indicates that his condition is a long-term one and cannot be easily cured or even improved, multiple experts said.

“If his condition were not serious, it would likely have been disclosed, or he would have received treatment and recovered,” said Shen Ming-shih, a researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taiwan.

“A prolonged need for recuperation—or deliberate, sustained concealment—points to a serious illness.”

Zhang Tianliang, professor at Fei Tian College and expert on Chinese history and politics, noted the cancellation of informal meetings between Xi and leaders of other countries at the upcoming summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in Shenzhen, China.

“The free talks between those leaders are very important because it’s not rehearsed, everything is impromptu, and some new ideas may emerge. They can do something together, instead of just reading a statement,” Zhang told The Epoch Times.

It may seem that Xi wants to exert control over what issues could be discussed, but Zhang said he believes that Xi’s health could well be the cause.

“I think that physical limitation basically can limit his ability to work, how many hours he can work every day,” he said.

The most likely scenario is that Xi’s health is deteriorating, but he still possesses his cognitive capabilities, multiple experts said. In that case, he’s likely to stay in power and secure another term as the CCP leader next fall.

It would be quite another matter if his condition were to worsen to the point that he is not able to show himself in public, the experts said.

If Xi becomes confined to bed or too frail to leave his quarters, the regime will likely enter a volatile state of uncertainty.

The experts agreed that even if incapacitated, Xi is unlikely to step down.

“In an authoritarian system, it is exceptionally rare for a supreme leader to step down voluntarily, as doing so would effectively mean forfeiting the political security guarantees for himself and his family,” Shen said.

It’s likely that Xi will cling to power until his last dying breath, and he may very well succeed.

“As long as he’s still alive, people won’t dare to move to do anything differently,” Dong said.

Just like CCP leader Mao Zedong in his final year, Xi would still be able to issue orders, and his underlings would still be afraid of him. His main problem would be an inability to obtain accurate information.

“When you have only a couple of people who can pass the real information to you, you’re actually very limited,” Zhang said. “You’re basically living in your own echo chamber.”

Just like Mao, Xi would likely rely on his wife and perhaps a few assistants. Those people would then immediately gain enormous influence.

“Whenever you’re relying on somebody to pass on information from the leader or to give information to the leader, that person typically abuses power, as Mao’s wife did. So I think we should expect that,” Thayer said.

Peng will likely play an outsized role, which may heighten frictions within the Party, multiple experts agreed.

Peng already holds the rank of major general in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and is responsible for promotions of generals. Dong noted that her English has significantly improved, and she already seems to play a subtle diplomatic role, as demonstrated by her behavior during the U.S. visit.

Still, even though nepotism is rampant within the regime, the understanding is that it mustn’t be practiced openly.

“China is not like North Korea. You can’t pass your power to your immediate family members,” Dong said.

“Mao Zedong tried that, and then within a month, his wife was arrested after Mao Zedong died. So in China, of course, Xi Jinping wants to promote Peng Liyuan, or maybe his daughter. But inside the CCP, there is a huge resistance to that.”

Thayer noted that, in contrast to Mao, even a bedridden Xi would have the advantage of obtaining information digitally.

“He would be able, I think, to get information, more information, and more reliably, and even himself,” he said.

He acknowledged, however, that Xi might not be able to verify whether the data he was accessing had been tampered with.

It’s likely that Xi’s understanding of reality would become seriously skewed, Zhang said.

“In that case, you will make wrong decisions, and then people will hate you more.”

It may easily mean Xi’s policies would become even more “draconian,” Thayer said.

“He could be very dangerous and very effective, even if he’s incapacitated,” he said.

It could be particularly dangerous if Xi’s mental health starts to give way.

“If his physical health were to compromise his mental soundness—leading to neurological or psychological instability—it could trigger sudden, manic episodes,” Wang said.

“This would render the surrounding geopolitical environment far more volatile; he might engage in reckless gambles or use such actions as an outlet for his pent-up emotions.”

Xi’s passing will immediately place the regime on shaky footing because there will be no one to easily step into his shoes, most of the experts agreed.

“He has been very careful about not naming his successor, at least to our knowledge,” Thayer said.

“Of course, that’s very important for him—not to name a successor—as that is insurance against a coalition forming around that successor to overthrow him.”

Formally, it will be up to the remaining members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo to select the new general secretary. The question is whether the members will be able to agree on a candidate.

“Because nobody is a legitimate successor, there will be [a] very strong power struggle. A lot of people will start to fight for that throne,” Zhang said.

Preoccupation with infighting may cause the CCP’s grip on society to somewhat slacken. And if no faction emerges as decidedly dominant, a compromise might be necessary, or a third party might step in to break the tie, he suggested.

“The third party could be another country like the United States, and it could also be the general public, such as workers or peasants. In that case, they need to appease the third party,” he said.

Xi’s knack for crushing his political enemies may prove pathological for the regime, several experts suggested.

In the past, it was common for the Party to have various cliques and prominent members who carried a measure of authority among the cadres. After more than a decade of Xi’s incessant purges, however, that is no longer the case.

“Since taking office in 2012, Xi Jinping has concentrated power to an extreme degree,” Shen said, noting that Xi dismantled the systems of “collective leadership” and “succession planning” established by Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping.

The Youth League faction of former CCP leader Hu Jintao and the Shanghai clique of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, have been all but eliminated.

“Right now in China, there is no faction that is strong enough to replace Xi Jinping and transition the power to them,” Dong said.

It appears the last top-level official who carried authority independent of Xi was Gen. Zhang Youxia, the highest uniformed officer in the PLA. Xi purged him last year.

The Party’s top echelons have been filled with Xi’s yes men, and that includes the Standing Committee.

“They rose up through secretaryship,” Dong said.

“They are not like governors. They don’t have governance experience. They’re basically his personal assistants. So they do not have background. They do not have their power base. They do not have their independent thoughts.”

In the case of Xi’s death, their mentality would be rather passive, he suggested.

“Most of them will choose to do nothing, because if they do nothing, they still keep their existing privilege, their personal wealth, their position in the party,” he said.

“They already have a lot. If they get more, they will get a little bit more than what they have, but the risk is enormous. If you fail, you lose everything.”

Of course, there are still people with significant power besides Xi—mainly, his top enforcers in the police, security, and Party disciplinary organs. Those, however, are unlikely to seize the top post successfully. On the contrary, they may be the first ones to fall.

“The person who holds the most secrets will be the target, and everybody else will band together and get rid of that risk factor,” Dong said, giving the example of the dreadful ends that secret police leaders met in Soviet Russia.

Even during Xi’s rather orderly ascent to power, Zhou Yongkang, the head of the CCP security apparatus at the time, was among the first Xi sent to prison.

Externally, the CCP might assume one of two positions, according to Shen.

“One possibility is the adoption of a more assertive or aggressive stance externally—such as escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait—to divert attention from internal conflicts,” he said.

“Alternatively, the leadership might opt for a strategic retrenchment, avoiding diplomatic friction while focusing on pressing domestic crises.”

With a power vacuum at the top, China may enter a political limbo.

“In China today, money is the most important issue. China is running out of money. Central government is running out of money, and the cash cows are a few provinces along the coastline,” Dong said.

To a large degree, the central government is playing the role of redistributor, taking money from wealthy provinces and using it to buy loyalty from the poorer provinces and, most importantly, the military, he said.

If the central government becomes paralyzed by passivity or internal strife, the wealthy provinces may adopt a form of passive resistance.

“They will do anything they can to delay their payment to the central government,” Dong said. “They are not going to raise the flag, saying: ‘OK, I want to be independent. I’m going to be rebellious.’ That’s not going to happen. But they will make sure that the money they used to give to the central government, they are going to use every possible bureaucratic lever to delay that.”

That would severely undermine the central government’s power. Yet it’s unlikely the military would sit idly by, waiting for a paycheck.

The PLA would have two possible courses of action: declare martial law and collect taxes itself, or band together with the Central Committee to back a candidate who promises to ensure the paycheck, Dong said.

“That leader will not be the smartest. He will not be the most competent. He will not be the most powerful. But he will be the most obedient. They basically want a puppet,” he said.

Thayer noted, though, that even a pick that seems ineffectual may quickly prove otherwise.

“These guys, once they secure power, can be very different leaders, can be far more ruthless, because they’re all thugs,” he said.

The example of Xi himself is illustrative. He was picked before 2012 as the next CCP leader because he seemed incompetent and easy to control, multiple experts agreed. Yet he managed to effectively eliminate any opposition to his absolute rule, purging millions of officials all the way up to fellow Politburo members.

China’s problem is the CCP political system itself, which not only lacks a mechanism to stop the ascent of an unhinged, absolute ruler, but actually promotes it.

“The political system itself is more pro-dictator,” Zhang said.

“Basically, everybody needs to listen to the Central Committee. The Central Committee needs to listen to the Politburo. The Politburo needs to listen to the Standing Committee, and the Standing Committee needs to listen to Xi Jinping.”

That may prove the regime’s undoing, as a weak leader, perhaps one still more incompetent than Xi, could lead the regime to its collapse, several experts suggested.

“If Xi Jinping’s rule were to collapse, there might be no one left to keep things under control. This would present a genuine opportunity for a seismic shift in China—one where the Communist Party could fall from power, opening a path toward democratization,” Wang said.

It might require, however, a perfect storm of circumstances: a power vacuum and infighting at the top, passive resistance among local officials, and an eruption of discontent among the populace.

“If, at the same time, the economic crisis remains unresolved, this could spark localized social unrest—potentially even leading to the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party,” Shen said.

Realistically, Chinese people are likely to prefer order, even a dictatorial one, to chaos, Dong said.

But a dictator doesn’t necessarily mean a communist one. There is great resentment among the populace toward Xi and toward the Party in general, multiple experts said.

For democracy to emerge, Chinese people would first need to realize its value, Su said.

“Naturally, we hope for a transition to democracy, though it is too early to say for certain,” he said.

“What we can hope for is that the Chinese people come to realize that enjoying basic dignity and rights requires a foundation of democracy.”