EU Cybersecurity Reform Marks Strategic Shift in Approach to Chinese Technology

The European Commission’s proposed revision of its Cybersecurity Act, unveiled on Jan. 20 in Strasbourg, marks a turning point in its approach to Chinese technology suppliers.

The draft regulation creates, for the first time, a legal framework empowering the commission to designate “third countries posing cybersecurity concerns” and to classify their suppliers as “high-risk.”

Although the text never names China, Huawei, or ZTE, its enforcement would result in the gradual exclusion of Chinese equipment from the bloc’s mobile, fixed, and satellite networks. The new architecture allows Brussels to override the reservations of capitals that have so far resisted excluding Chinese suppliers from their networks.

Should the text be adopted by the European Parliament, Brussels will join Washington, which excluded Huawei and ZTE from American mobile networks back in 2019.

A ‘European Awakening’

Emmanuel Lincot, sinologist, professor at the Catholic Institute of Paris, and senior research fellow at the Institute for International and Strategic Relations, said that the regulation reflects a strategic posture in Brussels.

“It is a good measure, and it was time,” he told The Epoch Times in an interview. “Many experts have long argued, with reason, that there was a danger in resorting to Huawei, whose intentions are not necessarily benevolent,” he said.

“This measure amounts to telling them: recess is over, we are not fooled, go home or change your attitude.”

Lincot reads the new approach as part of a broader trend.

“This protectionist measure is part of an awakening of a true European identity,” he said. “The war in Ukraine was the catalyst.”

The sinologist emphasized that a growing number of member states are also “getting wary” of the “Chinese project,” noting that the new Silk Roads were “not only an infrastructure project; they are also a digital project.”

Europe is engaged in an economic war with China, Lincot said.

“We are clearly in a logic of economic war against a backdrop of strong ideological rivalries,” he said.

On sensitive subjects, the precautionary principle is now placed very high, “and that is a warning addressed to the Chinese authorities,” he added.

The push to exclude Chinese suppliers comes as Huawei faces mounting fallout from a corruption investigation in Brussels, where the company is suspected of bribing members of the European Parliament.

Huawei lobbyists are barred from entering the commission and parliament premises.

Beijing’s Response

In a response submitted to the European Commission in mid-April, China’s Ministry of Commerce warned that broad retaliation was on the table if Huawei and ZTE were penalized.

Should Brussels designate China as a country posing cybersecurity concerns or list Chinese entities as high-risk suppliers, Beijing said, China could open investigations into European firms and adopt reciprocal measures.

Beijing’s submission demanded the deletion of the entire section on countries posing cybersecurity concerns, arguing that there was no technical evidence of Chinese firms posing security risks and that any decision based on non-technical criteria would be politically motivated.

The European Commission did not react to China’s threats and did not respond to The Epoch Times’ request for comments by publication time.

Adhering to European Standards

For Sébastien Garnault, founder of the Paris Cyber Summit—the European platform for strategic dialogue on cybersecurity that gathers ministers, U.S. and EU officials, parliamentarians, agency heads, and CEOs each year in Paris—the regulation should not be read as a measure aimed at China.

“The question is not whether we exclude this or that Chinese technology, but which security standards are imposed for entry into our market,” he told The Epoch Times in an interview. “This legislation is not directed against China. It is taken for Europeans. Chinese companies that comply with European standards will have access to the market.”

In his view, Brussels is doing nothing more than what Beijing has practiced for decades.

“When the French multinational retailer Carrefour wanted to set up there, it had to partner with a local company. That was the rule, and companies respected it to enter the market. When you do not meet the access conditions, you do not enter,” he stated.

According to Garnault, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, invoked by the Chinese commerce ministry, applies only to relations between EU member states.

“We have no right to discriminate against an Italian in France, but I fail to see where or when European law ever stated we cannot discriminate against foreign countries. That is precisely what tariffs and external trade regulation are for,” he said.

The French strategist pointed to the latest annual report from France’s National Cybersecurity Agency, ANSSI, which identifies China as one of the leading state-sponsored technological threats to French networks, alongside Russia.

This framing, Garnault contended, allows Brussels to construct its argument on a basis that is harder to challenge legally.

“The measure is not taken against the company; it is taken against a risk that has a geographical origin. It is the risk that has a geographical origin, not the technological solution,” he said.

Designing regulation that mitigates a risk emanating from a country, he said, nips the discrimination argument in the bud.

“China’s response was both predictable and straightforward,” he said. “Predictable, because any legislation that restricts commercial expansion tends to trigger retaliation. Straightforward, because it hinges on a demand for proof that is inherently difficult to establish: it is unlikely ever to be demonstrable that Huawei or ZTE are explicitly involved in advancing China’s national security objectives.”

Garnault stressed, however, that European concerns are rightly grounded in Chinese law itself.

“A Chinese law obliges Chinese companies to cooperate with the state, as do many other states, by the way,” he said.

“The problem may not be so much the Chinese company itself as the legislation that compels it to cooperate with intelligence services, including when the company is established in Europe. Same with U.S. intelligence legislation. Europe brings its own regulation for its domestic market, according to the diversity of risks and threats. It is up to companies to decide whether our market justifies the investment required to comply with our rules.”

This aerial view shows the factory of the Chinese multinational technology corporation Huawei, in Brumath, eastern France, on Dec. 9, 2025. Sébastien Bozon/AFP via Getty Images

He batted away the legal objections raised by Beijing’s commerce ministry.

“I invite the Chinese minister of Commerce to mind his own business,” he said. “It is not for him to tell us how things are done in Europe. We refrain from telling him how things should be done in China. Our market, our rules: simple, predictable.”

Patchwork Retreat From Huawei

Huawei, which employs around 10,000 people in Europe, is watching its commercial position erode sharply.

According to Danish consultancy organization Strand Consult, equipment from high-risk suppliers, overwhelmingly Huawei, accounted for roughly 30 percent of installed European 5G hardware at the start of 2026.

In Germany, some 59 percent of 5G antennas are still sourced from Chinese suppliers. But in July 2024, Berlin announced a ban on Huawei and ZTE components and technologies across its 5G networks. Products from the two companies are to be phased out of the network “core” by “the end of 2026 at the latest,” according to Nancy Faeser, then Germany’s interior minister.

Italy has stopped short of an outright ban on Chinese manufacturers, instead reviewing contracts on a case-by-case basis. In 2020, telecom operator Fastweb was blocked from signing a 5G deal with Huawei.

In France, the 2019 law on the protection of national defense interests forced operators SFR and Bouygues Telecom to dismantle thousands of Chinese antennas, and Huawei’s market share fell to 13 percent by 2024. Its French revenue has roughly halved since 2019, dropping from 1.4 billion euros to 695 million.

Spain has taken the opposite path. Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has repeatedly called for closer alignment with Beijing, and his government signed a 12 million euro contract with Huawei in 2025 to store sensitive judicial data derived from wiretaps.

The decision has not gone unnoticed in Washington. Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Tom Cotton and House Intelligence Committee Chair Rick Crawford have urged Tulsi Gabbard, director of national intelligence, to review intelligence-sharing agreements with Madrid, accusing Spain of jeopardizing allied security.