Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu speaks during a press conference in Taipei, Taiwan, on March 26, 2023. (SAM YEH/AFP via Getty Images)
Drawing upon Taiwan’s experience, Mr. Wu highlighted the issue of Beijing’s influence, particularly through its United Front Work Department (UFWD), known for its role in conducting foreign interference operations. He noted the UFWD strategically leveraged its resources, including people, immigration channels, and the Chinese diaspora communities, not only in Canada but also other countries, in efforts to achieve its objectives.
He said China aims to infiltrate Taiwanese society through disinformation campaigns and cognitive warfare, often utilizing media outlets more sympathetic to China than to Taiwan.
“We have told the Canadian friends that if they think that this information campaign or [UFWD] or that kind of thing is getting too serious in Canada, we would like to engage with the Canadian government officials so that we can share our experiences with our Canadian friends, and not limited to Canada,” he said.
China analysts have pointed to Beijing’s control and utilization of the media to promote its image and further its global objectives.
Mr. Ho said Beijing employs three types of media outlets to extend its influence abroad and control overseas Chinese communities. These outlets include overseas branches of Chinese state media, Hong Kong-originated outlets influenced by Beijing, and overseas media established by Chinese groups aligned with Beijing’s interests.
Mr. Wu said that by influencing online and print news sources, Beijing distorts the perspectives of many members of the Chinese diaspora communities. Citing instances in New Zealand and Malaysia, he noted that a significant portion of the diaspora now holds the belief that the conflict in Ukraine was initiated by the United States.
Tactics
China’s foreign interference tactics continuously evolve, according to Jyh-horng Jan, the deputy minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, an administrative agency tasked with managing relationships between the island and mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau.
Citing leaked documents from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, it highlighted the regime’s pressure on its consulates to leverage politically motivated Chinese diaspora community members to advance its objectives. Other tactics involved making undisclosed cash donations to political campaigns and having business owners hire international Chinese students, then assigning them to volunteer full-time in electoral campaigns.